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In this connection another disaster has been brought about by modern psychology; old-time logic is popularly labeled 'the science of the equation of concepts' or 'the science of equivalent expressions,' but usually in such a way as to make one think that *what* the logician compares are the psychical states, as some 'condition of mind,' instead of the intended meanings, which are not ideas nor feelings nor volition. A discussion of this error can not find place here. Enough to say, though, that the relations of my 'mental states' to one another are *toto cælo* different from the relations of the things I 'think about' (while in those states) to one another.

There are, then, at least three distinct problems. Thus far no evidence is forthcoming whereby any one of them may be reduced to the terms and conditions of either or both of the others. Unless, carried away by the wish to find a smooth philosophy, we must content ourselves with special studies. And this forbids sweeping condemnation of other lines of investigation. It is unsafe to say much more than this as yet. Old-fashioned logic is being taken up by mathematicians, and expanded far beyond its scholastic form; as a science of correction it is still active. Merely because it can not do duty as a metaphysic, a theory of ethics and a biology, is hardly an honest reason for hooting it out of court. Substantially the same charge may be brought against its scoffer; genetic logic hardly helps us to think better, any more than it can explain the 'origins' of logical consistency or can derive what I will to mean from the conditions which lead me to desire 'things.'

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DISCUSSION

IS RADICAL EMPIRICISM SOLIPSISTIC?

IF all the criticisms which the humanistic *Weltauschauung* is receiving were as *sachgemäß* as Mr. Bode's in this JOURNAL for March 2, the truth of the matter would more rapidly clear up. Not only is it excellently well written, but it brings its own point of view out clearly, and admits of a perfectly straight reply.

The argument (unless I fail to catch it) can be expressed as follows:

If a series of experiences be supposed, no one of which is endowed immediately with the self-transcendent function of reference to a reality beyond itself, no motive will occur within the series for supposing anything beyond it to exist. It will remain subjective, and contentedly subjective, both as a whole and in its several parts.

Radical empiricism, trying, as it does, to account for objective knowledge by means of such a series, egregiously fails. It can not explain how the notion of a physical order, as distinguished from a subjectively biographical order, of experiences, ever arose.

It pretends to explain the notion of a physical order, but does so by playing fast and loose with the concept of objective reference. On the one hand, it denies that such reference implies self-transcendency on the part of any one experience; on the other hand, it claims that experiences *point*. But, critically considered, there can be no pointing unless self-transcendency be also allowed. The conjunctive function of pointing, as I have assumed it, is, according to my critic, vitiated by the fallacy of attaching a bilateral relation to a term *a quo*, as if it could stick out substantively and maintain itself in existence in advance of the term *ad quem* which is equally required for it to be a concretely experienced fact. If the relation be made concrete, the term *ad quem* is involved, which would mean (if I succeed in apprehending Mr. Bode rightly) that this latter term, although not empirically there, is yet *noetically* there, in advance—in other words it would mean that any experience that ‘points’ must already have transcended itself, in the ordinary ‘epistemological’ sense of the word transcend.

Something like this, if I understand Mr. Bode’s text, is the upshot of his state of mind. It is a reasonable sounding state of mind, but it is exactly the state of mind which radical empiricism, by its doctrine of the reality of conjunctive relations, seeks to dispel. I very much fear—so difficult does mutual understanding seem in these exalted regions—that my able critic has failed to understand that doctrine as it is meant to be understood. I suspect that he performs on all these conjunctive relations (of which the aforesaid ‘pointing’ is only one) the usual rationalistic act of substitution—he takes them not as they are given in their first intention, as parts constitutive of experience’s living flow, but only as they appear in retrospect, each fixed as a determinate object of conception, static, therefore, and contained within itself.

Against this rationalistic tendency to treat experience as chopped up into discontinuous static objects, radical empiricism protests. It insists on taking conjunctions at their ‘face-value,’ just as they come. Consider, for example, such conjunctions as ‘and,’ ‘with,’ ‘near,’ ‘plus,’ ‘towards.’ While we live in such conjunctions our state is one of *transition* in the most literal sense. We are expectant of a ‘more’ to come, and before the more *has* come, the transition, nevertheless, is directed *towards* it. I fail otherwise to see how, if one kind of more comes, there should be satisfaction and feeling of ful-

fillment; but disappointment if the more comes in another shape. One more will continue, another more will arrest or deflect the direction, in which our experience is moving even now. We can not, it is true, *name* our different living 'ands' or 'withs' except by naming the different terms towards which they are moving us, but we *live* their specifications and differences before those terms explicitly arrive. Thus, though the various 'ands' are all bilateral relations, each requiring a term *ad quem* to define it when viewed in retrospect and articulately conceived, yet in its living moment any one of them may be treated as if it 'stuck out' from its term *a quo* and pointed in a special direction, much as a compass-needle (to use Mr. Bode's excellent simile) points at the pole, even though it stirs not from its box.

In Professor Höffding's massive little article in a recent number of this JOURNAL,¹ he quotes a saying of Kierkegaard's to the effect that we live forwards, but we understand backwards. Understanding backwards is, it must be confessed, a very frequent weakness of philosophers, both of the rationalistic and of the ordinary empiricist type. Radical empiricism alone insists on understanding forwards also, and refuses to substitute static concepts of the understanding for transitions in our moving life. A logic similar to that which my critic seems to employ here should, it seems to me, forbid him to say that our present is, while present, directed towards our future, or that any physical movement can have direction until its goal is actually reached.

At this point does it not seem as if the quarrel about self-transcendency in knowledge might drop? Is it not a purely verbal dispute? Call it self-transcendency or call it pointing, whichever you like—it makes no difference so long as real transitions towards real goals are admitted as things given *in* experience, and among experience's most indefeasible parts. Radical empiricism, unable to close its eyes to the transitions caught *in actu*, accounts for the self-transcendency or the pointing (whichever you may call it) as a process that occurs within experience, as an empirically mediated thing of which a perfectly definite description can be given. 'Epistemology,' on the other hand, denies this; and pretends that the self-transcendency is unmediated or, if mediated, then mediated in a super-empirical world. To justify this pretension, epistemology has first to transform all our conjunctions into static objects, and this, I submit, is an absolutely arbitrary act. But in spite of Mr. Bode's maltreatment of conjunctions, as I understand them—and as I understand him—I believe that at bottom we are fighting for nothing dif-

¹ Vol. II., No. 4, pp. 85-92.

ferent, but are both defending the same continuities of experience in different forms of words.

There are other criticisms in the article in question, but, as this seems the most vital one, I will for the present, at any rate, leave them untouched.

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REVIEWS AND ABSTRACTS OF LITERATURE

University of California Publications. Philosophy. Volume I. Studies in Philosophy prepared in Commemoration of the Seventieth Birthday of Professor George Holmes Howison. Berkeley. The University Press. November 29, 1904.

This volume is beautifully executed, and its essays are all of solid merit. Dealing as they do with diverse topics, it will be best to take up each in turn very briefly.

The first paper is entitled *The Summum Bonum*, by Professor McGilvary. "Before discussing the question of the nature of the highest good we must first ascertain what is meant by 'good' in the positive degree." But 'good' is an ambiguous term. Sometimes it means the 'pleasant'; sometimes, the 'desired.' Sometimes, the desirable in the sense of 'that which we should desire if all the consequences of all the different lines of conduct open to us were actually exercising on us an impulsive force proportioned to the desires or aversions which they would excite if actually experienced' (what the author calls the 'teleologically desirable'). Sometimes it means the desirable, not in the sense that we now do, or ever will desire it, but in the sense that we 'feel that we *should* desire it' (the 'categorically desirable'). Besides all these meanings, the good may mean, 'not the obligation to *desire* the object, but the obligation to *attain* the object without reference to desire' (the 'categorically obligatory').

"Having thus discovered so many meanings for the term 'good,' we should be prepared to find as many meanings for the term 'highest good' or *summum bonum*. And this is exactly what we do find." Along with this conception of the highest good there goes a sense of obligation to strive to attain it, the 'good' and the 'obligatory' being identical only in the last of the uses of the term above enumerated.

'We are now prepared to take up the question whether there is any *reasonable highest good* for men at large.' From the individualistic point of view none can be asserted. But from the point of view of the social nature of the individual 'all normal men do have at heart the good of some other beings than themselves,' and this common good becomes identified with the individual good. In this sense only is there a highest good.

The second paper, by Professor Mezes is a discussion of *The Essentials of Human Faculty*. It is a statement of the principal reasons for the human ascendancy, the chief of which on the mental side is the 'ability to decide among alternatives.'